The History of Political Theory and Other Essays by John …
The readers grade writing not content so no matter what position you take you can get a good score if its well written. Akil (sorry boss) would have gotten a better score if he held a bit better to his point and developed his argument better. There have been published essays where the author advocated atrocities like the Holocaust and still got above a 10. Its writing primarily that governs the score, all other things are secondary. Test-takers should keep that in mind and not get so caught up in trying to follow someone elses list of dos and donts.
Process and Content Theory of Motivation and ..
Price (2001) offers a detailed teleological theory that is similar toMillikan's. She defends Millikan's interpretation of the mind of thekimu on the ground that it better explains their behavior. Sheendorses the idea that the point of making content ascriptions is torationalize behavior and her claim is that a desire to avoid snorf isa better reason to climb to the top of the hill than a desire to watchthe sun rise or see red flowers. Several responses are possible. Oneis that a desire to watch a sunrise is reason enough to climb ahill. Another is that we are left without a rational explanation ofwhy a kimu would be eager to enter snorf-infested space when the snorfare near red, other than that they are psychologically incapable ofcorrectly representing the presence of snorf when snorf are nearred. A further possible response is to question whether it is the roleof content ascriptions to rationalize behavior (as famously claimed byDavidson (1985) and Dennett (1996)).
Pietroski argues that biting the bullet is radically revisionist inthis case. Behavioral tests, he says, could support his claim. Planta red flag among a crowd of snorf and the kimu will eagerly jointhem. It is consistent with his story that contemporary kimu mightnever have seen a snorf and might be unable to recognise one were itstood smack in front of their faces. Intuitively, we want to say thatthey might know nothing of snorf, he says. Pietroski suggests thatthis might be a problem for all teleological theories ofcontent. However, it is more specifically an objection to abenefit-based version (some other teleological theories of contentimply that the kimu represent red, see ).
MLO 1: Content and Theory in Psychology | jkitesite
Fodor's example is the frog that snaps at anything that is suitablysmall, dark and moving and thereby feeds itself. According to Fodor,if it was adaptive for the frog to snap at flies then it was equallyadaptive for it to snap at small, dark, moving things on thesimplifying assumption that flies and small, dark, moving things werereliably co-extensive in the frog's natural habitat. According toFodor, we can equally well say that the function of the device is todetect flies and that its function is to detect small, dark,moving things. So, if we try to determine the content of therepresentation by reference to the function of the detectionmechanism, the content remains indeterminate. We can choose todescribe the function one way or another but if the content depends onhow we choose to describe the function it is not a naturalizedcontent. Note that the candidate contents fly and frogfood and small, dark moving thing each license differentassessments concerning misrepresentation. If the frog is representingthe stimulus as a fly, for instance, it misrepresents something thatis small, dark and moving that is not a fly, using the relevantrepresentation. If it represents the stimulus as small, dark andmoving, it does not.
Content and Theory in Psychology
Fodor once devised a teleological theory of mental content(published years later, as Fodor 1990a). However, he quickly repudiatedthe idea and has since been one of the most vigorous critics ofthe general idea. His main objection was initially that teleologicaltheories leave content indeterminate because functions areindeterminate. Functional indeterminacy, accordingto Fodor (1990b), stems from the fact that natural selection isextensional in the following sense: if it is adaptive for an organism,O, to do something, M, in the presence ofenvironmental feature, F, and F is reliablyco-extensive with another feature, G, then it is equallyadaptive for O to do M in the presence of G.Fodor argues that teleological theories therefore cannot distinguishbetween candidate contents that are co-extensional in the environmentin which a creature evolved.
CBI took some of its theory and design ..
There are several potential indeterminacy problems. Aside from theproblem of distal content, which has already been discussed above inrelation to the different theories that treat it in different ways,there are two other indeterminacy problems. One concerns the factthat natural selection is extensional (Fodor, 1990b) and the otherconcerns the fact that natural selection selects traits for complexcausal roles (Neander, 1995). Both problems can perhaps be attributedto Dretske (1986), though Dretske did not distinguish them from theproblem of distal content, the problem he seems primarily to have beeninterested in solving.