But a great deal more needs to be said.
A naive gullibility, like that of , Roosevelt, or Carter, is ultimately of no benefit to justice, when those who are treacherous by preference triumph over those who would rather lose than respond in kind.
However, both of these views are based on a misconception.
Machiavelli say that "it is often necessary to act against mercy, against faith, against humanity, against frankness, against religion in order to preserve the state," which does seem to say that the state, and not personal or dynastic ambition, is the proper end of statecraft.
Berlin acknowledges that Machiavelli uses, following a long , the justification of "necessity" ( -- , "necessity knows no law"), but he seems to be saying that Machiavelli doesn't really it and, apparently not worrying about it very much, he shouldn't.
However, he was no disciple of Machiavelli just .
Caiaphas was in fact doing his , as we construe the duty of a , as opposed to the duty of a private person. Whatever the institutional self-interest of Caiaphas may have been, what we see in his reasoning is a proper appreciation of his position of political responsibility.
He did not admire tyranny; he did not admire, but despised, Caesar.
An evil-skeptic might reply that we should abandon only the conceptof evil, and not other normative concepts, because the concept of evilis particularly dangerous or susceptible to abuse. We can discernseveral reasons why ascriptions of evil might be thought to be moreharmful or dangerous than ascriptions of other normative concepts suchas badness or wrongdoing. First, since ascriptions of evil arethe greatest form of moral condemnation, when the term‘evil’ is misapplied we subject someone to a particularlyharsh judgement undeservedly. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assumethat evildoers not only deserve the greatest form of moral condemnationbut also the greatest form of punishment. Thus, not only are wrongfullyaccused evildoers subjected to harsh judgments undeservedly, they maybe subjected to harsh punishments undeservedly as well.
I'm neither proud of it nor ashamed; it's the means we have.
The lives of many, the "whole nation," depend on Caiaphas; and if he must truly chose between the innocent lives of many and the innocent life of one, then, however unpleasant, disturbing, or regretable, the trust that the many have placed in him must predominate and he must do what is necessary that "that the whole nation should not perish." The reality of the kind of choices Caiaphas had to make is confirmed by the fact that the "whole nation" did perish in the great revolt against the Romans, the of 66-73 AD, when the Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed and Jews were actually expelled from the city.
Has not this violated the Professor's principles?
Later, when we find the quote, "You do not realize that it is better for you that one man die for the people than that the whole nation perish" [p.176], the authors remark, "Nothing more needs to be said" .
We see the rationale next:He chuckled.
The peril of Caiaphas' position is revealed when we find that the High Priest Ananus and his colleague Jesus ben Gamaliel were murdered by the Zealots, led by John of Gischala, in 67.